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This paper empirically analyses the role of Islamic banking in financial intermediation 
costs as measured by net interest margins for a leading dual banking country, 
Malaysia. Controlling for theoretically motivated determinants of the margins, the 
paper compares the interest/financing margins of conventional and Islamic banks 
and examines the impacts of Islamic banking presence on bank margins. The analysis 
provides evidence of the higher margins of Islamic banks compared to those of 
conventional banks. Further, the difference in bank margins between the two types 
of banks can be attributed to differences in market power, operating costs, and 
diversification. Finally, Islamic banking presence or penetration, as represented by 
the ratio of Islamic financing to aggregate bank credit/financing and, alternatively, the 
share of Islamic banking assets, is robustly associated with lower bank margins, on 
average. These results bear important implications for the development of the Islamic 
banking industry and in fostering the efficient allocation of financial resources by the 
banking system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Islamic banking has demonstrated remarkable development, even amid the global 
financial crisis, and has risen into prominence in several dual banking jurisdictions. 
According to Ernst & Young’s World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 
2016, Islamic banking recorded an asset growth rate of 16% per annum from 2010 
to 2014. While the growth of Islamic banking assets has slowed down in recent 
years, with a compound annual growth rate of 8.8% from the last quarter of 
2013 to 2017 (Islamic Financial Services Board, or IFSB, 2018), they continue to 
outpace their conventional counterparts. Islamic banking is now systematically 
important in 10 dual banking countries, according to the IFSB, an international 
standard-setting organization for the Islamic financial services industry, based in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.1 A natural question that arises, then, from this rapid 
emergence of Islamic banking is whether Islamic banking contributes to financial 
and economic development.
This paper aims to answer the question by addressing a core aspect of financial 
intermediaries, that is, financial intermediation costs. More specifically, focusing 
on Malaysia, we examine the extent to which the presence of Islamic banking 
affects financial intermediation costs as measured by net interest margins.2 Among 
systematically important dual banking countries, Malaysia is at the forefront in 
the development of Islamic banking, with many countries attempting to emulate 
its model and framework (Lassoued, 2018; Solarin et al., 2018). Starting with only 
one full-fledged Islamic bank and a few Islamic windows of conventional banks 
before the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia 
now comprises five full-fledged Islamic banks and 11 Islamic bank subsidiaries 
of conventional banks. Since the Asian crisis, the sector’s asset and financing 
shares have increased uninterruptedly and surpassed 25% and 30%, respectively, 
in 2017.3 Interestingly, the increase in Islamic banking presence has taken place 
against a backdrop of conventional banking consolidation and concern about its 
impact (Sufian and Habibullah, 2013). In light of this, we ask, do Islamic banks 
have lower intermediation costs? Can Islamic banks affect the pricing and margin 
behavior of the consolidated conventional banking sector or of the banking sector 
in general? Malaysia provides an ideal setting to address these questions.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we contribute to a growing list 
of studies on Islamic banking and its financial and economic roles. Predominantly, 
studies have focused on comparative analyses of Islamic and conventional banks 
based on various performance metrics, most notably efficiency (Beck et al., 2013; 
Johnes et al., 2014; Abdul-Majid et al., 2017; Alqahtani et al., 2017), risk/stability 
1 The IFSB categorizes a country as having a systematically important Islamic banking sector based on 
an asset share of 15% or higher. Excluding the full-fledged Islamic banking system in Iran and Sudan, 
there were 10 such countries by 2016: Bangladesh, Brunei, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
2 Islamic banking strictly prohibits interest, and, hence, the margins for Islamic banks are normally 
referred to as net financing margins. To avoid repeating the term interest/financing in reference to 
conventional and Islamic banks, we use the terms net margins, bank margins, and simply margins 
throughout.
3 The figures are based on Monthly Highlights and Statistics (January 2018), Table 1.7 (Banking System: 
Statement of Assets) and Table 1.71 (Islamic Banking System: Statement of Assets), published by 
Bank Negara Malaysia (i.e. the Central Bank of Malaysia).
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(Beck et al., 2013; Boukhis and Nabi, 2013; Kabir et al., 2015; Sorwar et al., 2016; 
Kabir and Worthington, 2017; Zins and Weill, 2017; Alqahtani and Mayes, 2018; 
Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018), profitability (Olson and Zoubi, 2017; Trad et al., 2017; 
Yanikkaya et al., 2018), and financing/deposit behavior (Abdul Karim et al., 2014; 
Ibrahim, 2016; Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018). The underlying premise of these studies is 
that, if Islamic banks are demonstrated to be more efficient, more stable, and more 
profitable and their financing behavior less procyclical, they would contribute 
more positively to the well-functioning of the financial system and, consequently, 
the health of the economy. Recent studies have also directly assessed the roles of 
Islamic banks in financial and economic development (Gheeraert, 2014; Gheeraert 
and Weill, 2016; Imam and Kpodar, 2016; Lebdaoui and Wild, 2016). We add to this 
literature by bringing to the fore the issue of financial intermediation costs.
 Our second contribution stems from the fact that, compared to other 
dimensions of bank performance, the implications of Islamic banking on financial 
intermediation costs remain understudied. Arguably, Islamic banking presence 
can result in higher or lower bank margins. In the provision of banking services, 
Islamic banks face additional risk and requirements, such as Shari’ah non-
compliant risk, Shari’ah governance requirement, and the complexity of contracts. 
This means that, at the outset, Islamic banking services involve higher costs. 
Accordingly, to account for the additional costs from adherence to Islamic law, 
or Shari’ah, Islamic banks can set larger margins. The increasing presence of 
Islamic banking, however, induces competitive pressure and can thus favorably 
influence pricing in the banking industry. In other words, indirectly, through bank 
competition, the presence of Islamic banks would lead to lower net margins in the 
banking sector. An analysis is therefore necessary to ascertain whether Islamic 
banking entails higher costs and whether Islamic banking presence shapes the 
intermediation costs of the banking sector. Such insight would be important for 
drawing policy initiatives to foster the efficient allocation of resources by the 
Islamic banking sector and the overall banking system.
 After controlling for their differences in market power, capitalization or 
risk aversion, scale of lending activity, operating costs, and diversification, our 
analysis provides evidence that Islamic banks have higher net margins. Further, 
the difference in the margins of Islamic and conventional banks is attributed to 
the differences in their market power, operating costs, and diversification. Finally, 
Islamic banking presence, as represented by the ratio of Islamic financing to 
aggregate bank credit/financing and, alternatively, the share of Islamic banking 
assets, is robustly associated with lower bank margins, on average. Thus, to optimize 
the benefits of Islamic banking presence, the development of Islamic banking 
should be encouraged, however, measures are needed to reduce the incremental 
costs incurred by Islamic banks in their adherence to Shari’ah principles, as well as 
to reduce cost inefficiency and to expand into non-intermediation activities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section 
III describes the empirical approach. Section IV presents the data and estimation 
results. Finally, Section V concludes the paper with a summary of the main findings 
and policy implications.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE
The theoretical basis for bank margins is the dealership model developed by Ho 
and Saunders (1981) and later augmentations by Allen (1988), Angbanzo (1997), 
and Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004). According to the (augmented) 
dealership model, variations in margins across banks are accounted for by the 
following factors: market structure, transaction size, managerial risk aversion, 
interest rate uncertainty, operating costs, diversification, and credit risk. Taking 
advantage of the model’s flexibility in terms of factors to be included, some studies 
have also considered regulations, institutional quality, and bank ownership 
to explain variations in bank margins (Poghosyan, 2010, 2013; Fungacova and 
Poghosyan, 2011; Birchwood et al., 2017). Beck and Hesse (2009) neatly categorize 
these factors under four views: a risk-based view, a small financial system view, a 
market structure view, and a macroeconomic view.
Empirically, research on bank margins comprises cross-country or single-
country studies, focusing on either identifying which of the aforementioned 
theoretically motivated determinants explain the margins or assessing the 
margins’ specific determinants. Among a multitude of theoretically motivated 
factors, operating costs, loan quality, diversification, and competition have 
featured prominently as significant determinants of bank margins in cross-
country studies (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Carbo-Valverde and 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2007; Williams, 2007; Kasman et al., 2010; Poghosyan, 2010, 
2013; Chortareas et al., 2012; Birchwood et al., 2017). In addition to these variables, 
several studies have also considered institutional factors and bank ownership. For 
instance, according to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), the institutional framework is 
key in explaining bank margins in their analysis of 1,400 banks from 72 countries. 
Poghosyan (2013) identifies institutional weaknesses in low-income countries as 
one of the main reasons for their sustained high margins. Beck and Hesse (2009) 
attribute the consistently high interest rate margins in Uganda, compared to 
other countries, to, among other factors, the country’s institutional deficiencies. 
Regarding bank ownership, Beck and Hesse (2009) fail to document a significant 
impact of foreign bank presence on bank margins. Poghosyan (2010) corroborates 
the nonsignificance of foreign bank participation in directly or indirectly 
influencing financial intermediation costs in 11 Central and Eastern European 
countries. Interestingly, using foreign bank participation to represent the ease of 
bank entry requirements and banking sector openness, Birchwood et al. (2017) 
suggest the importance of foreign bank presence in the reduction of bank margins.
Noting that inefficiencies of financial intermediation as manifested by high 
margins are more a feature of developing countries, several single-country studies 
focus on countries known for having high margins, include those of Beck and 
Hesse (2009) for Uganda, Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011) for Russia, Hossain 
(2012) for Bangladesh, Were and Wambua (2014) for Kenya, and Trinugroho et 
al. (2014) for Indonesia. Although these studies generally support the dealership 
model and its extensions, they all highlight cost inefficiency, as measured by 
operating or administrative costs, as being central. In addition, as noted above, 
Beck and Hesse (2009) unequivocally support risk-related factors, as represented 
by institutional quality or deficiencies and exposure to risky sectors, in explaining 
financial intermediation costs for the case of Uganda.
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Over recent years, Islamic banking has become a key financial development 
feature in various markets, particularly in Malaysia and the Middle East. Its ever-
increasing presence in these countries notwithstanding, the public generally views 
Islamic banking as more expensive than its conventional counterpart. Corroborating 
this popular view, Ernst & Young’s World Islamic Banking Competitiveness 
Report 2011–2012 notes higher margins of Islamic banks, compared to those of 
conventional banks. Beck et al. (2013) empirically suggest that Islamic banks are 
less cost efficient. While this is worrisome, since high margins are tantamount 
to the inefficient allocation of resources, a simple comparison of the margins of 
Islamic and conventional banks cannot provide a complete picture of the reasons 
behind higher Islamic bank margins and of the role of Islamic banking in financial 
intermediation costs.
Along with Poghosyan’s (2010) evaluation of foreign bank penetration, we 
can argue that Islamic banking can exert both direct and indirect effects on bank 
margins. Being financial intermediaries, Islamic banks face similar risks as those 
of conventional banks, including credit risk, liquidity risk, and interest rate risk. 
However, distinct from conventional banks in their adherence to the principles 
of Shari’ah, Islamic banks’ operations entail additional unique risks, including 
fiduciary risk, displaced commercial risk, and rate of return risk (Archer and 
Karim, 2006). Islamic banking transactions also run the risk of being Shari’ah non-
compliant after contracts are concluded, also known as Shari’ah non-compliant 
risk. Apart from these risks, the financial contracts of Islamic banks are more 
complex compared to those of conventional banks. Further, Islamic banks normally 
have two layers of governance: a standard board and a Shari’ah board. Given these 
unique risk-related and institutional features, Islamic banking products are likely 
to be more costly. Since these characteristics are unlikely to be fully accounted for 
by the standard determinants of margins, the direct effect of Islamic banking is an 
increase in its margins.
Indirectly, increasing the presence of Islamic banking should lead to greater 
competition in the banking sector. As hypothesized by Abedifar et al., (2016), 
this would likely have a spillover effect on conventional banks, such that, in the 
presence of Islamic banking, conventional banks become more cost efficient. 
Utilizing bank-level data from 22 Muslim countries with a dual banking system, 
these authors document evidence of a positive relation between the cost efficiency 
of conventional banks in predominantly Muslim countries and the presence of 
large Islamic banks. Similarly, Meslier et al. (2017) find that conventional banks 
tend to set higher deposit rates in countries with a strong Islamic bank presence. 
We can further argue that, as more players enter the Islamic banking segment, 
increasing competition will make Islamic banks more efficient. Thus, unlike the 
direct effect stemming from the different pricing of Islamic banking products, the 
presence of Islamic banking can indirectly reduce financial intermediation costs in 
the banking sector.
Although empirical literature on Islamic banking is expanding, studies on 
the relations between Islamic banking and bank margins or intermediation costs 
remain limited. Further, such studies focus mainly on identifying the determinants 
of Islamic banks’ net margins or, at most, comparing the determinants of bank 
margins for Islamic and conventional banks (e.g., Abdul Kader Malim et al., 
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2017; Sun et al., 2017; Trinugroho et al., 2018). Accordingly, no inferences can be 
made about whether Islamic banking presence results in higher or lower financial 
intermediation costs. This paper fills this gap in the Islamic banking literature.
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The model specification for bank margins takes the form of either a static panel 
model (Beck and Hesse, 2009; Poghosyan, 2010) or a dynamic panel model 
(Birchwood et al., 2017; Claessens et al., 2018). We opt for the static panel model to 
investigate the role of Islamic banking presence in financial intermediation costs. 
The key reason is our panel sample size does not fit the dynamic panel setting. For 
consistency, dynamic panel regressions are normally estimated using generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators (Iwanics-Drozdowska and Witkowski, 
2016). The GMM approach, however, requires a panel of large N and small T. Its 
application to a panel data set such as ours, where N < 40, can result in serious 
bias. Moreover, due to the first differencing and employment of lagged variables 
as instruments, the use of GMM estimators would mean the loss of further 
observations. Given our small sample size, we deem the static panel regression 
more appropriate. Having cautioned against its use, we also experiment with the 
dynamic panel model specification estimated via the system GMM estimator, for 
the sake of robustness.
Building on the work of Poghosyan (2010), which is based on the dealership 
model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and its later extensions, we specify the following 
general specification to address the extent to which Islamic banking presence 
affects net margins:
where BM is the net margin as a measure of financial intermediation costs; IB is 
an Islamic bank dummy; IBShare is the market share of the Islamic banking sector; 
Bank is a vector of bank-specific variables; Macro is a vector of macroeconomic 
variables; D is a vector of dummy variables, such as a foreign bank dummy and 
crisis dummies; μi is bank-specific effects, and εit is a standard error term. Note 
that the bank-specific variables are lagged by one year to address endogeneity 
concerns.
A more direct measure of net margins is the difference between lending/
financing and deposit rates, which can be based on the implicit lending rate 
(interest/financing income on loans over total loans) and the implicit deposit rate 
(interest/financing expenses on customer deposits to total deposits), following 
Birchwood et al. (2017). However, the information on interest/financing income 
on loans and interest/financing expenses on customer deposits is only available 
for a short time. Accordingly, we use the ratio of gross interest/financing and 
dividend income net of total interest/financing expenses to average earning assets, 
which is another standard measure of BM in the literature (Beck and Hesse, 2009; 
Poghosyan, 2010; Claessens et al., 2018).
(1)
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The key variables in Equation (1) are IB and IBShare, where IB is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the bank is Islamic, and zero otherwise. The 
inclusion of IB is to test whether the margins of Islamic banks are, on average, 
significantly different from the margins of conventional banks, which can be 
considered a direct effect of Islamic banking presence. We expect Islamic banks 
to have higher margins due to their specific, unique cost-related characteristics, 
such as Shari’ah non-compliant risk, Shari’ah governance, and the complexity of 
contracts. We use the Islamic banking share in the credit/financing markets for 
IBShare, in line with the work of Beck and Hesse (2009), who employ the share 
of foreign banks in lending markets to capture foreign bank penetration. The 
increasing presence of Islamic banks would exert competitive pressure on the 
banking sector and potentially alter the pricing behavior of not only Islamic banks, 
but conventional banks as well. We expect the coefficient of IBShare to be negative.
The bank-specific variables (Bank) include standard determinants of net margins, 
namely, bank competition or market power, capitalization or risk aversion, loan 
quality, the scale of lending activities or the size of banking operations, operating 
costs, and diversification. In the analysis, we use a nonstructural measure of 
bank competition, that is, the Lerner index (LERNER). Several studies have shed 
doubt on the traditional measures of market structure and competition, such as 
concentration ratios and the Herfindahl index (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Beck 
and Hesse, 2009). Capturing the ability to price their products above marginal 
costs, the Lerner index can better capture the degree of market power/competition 
banks face, which, reasonably, should be different across banks and over time. We 
expect market power to increase bank margins. For capitalization, we employ the 
ratio of equity to total assets (EQA). This measure is to reflect the degree of risk 
aversion and, hence, according to the dealership model, it is positively related 
to margins. Loan quality is represented by the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPL). Its impact on margins is expected to be positive, since banks 
can require larger margins to compensate for potential loss. Following Poghosyan 
(2010), we use the natural logarithm of total loans (Ln(LOAN)) to capture the scale of 
operations or the size of banking transactions. While the dealership model expects 
a positive association between the size of operations and margins, the relation can 
be negative because of economies of scale. We measure operating costs as the ratio 
of operating expenses to total assets (OPCOST). We expect higher operating costs 
to result in higher margins. Finally, income from non-interest income activities, 
represented by the ratio of non-interest income to total income (NII), is expected to 
lower margins due to banks’ potential cross-subsidization.
In line with the literature, we include the following macroeconomic variables 
(Macro) in the analysis: gross domestic product (GDP) growth (∆Y), inflation 
(INF), the interest rate (INTR), and interest rate uncertainty (σ(INTR)). The effect 
of GDP growth on bank margins cannot be signed a priori. On one hand, as noted 
by Poghosyan (2013) and Birchwood et al. (2017), economic growth expands 
investment activities and improves borrowers’ creditworthiness. Accordingly, 
bank margins will be lower. On the other hand, the increases in credit demand and 
deposit supply from economic expansion can widen bank margins (Birchwood 
et al., 2017). Capturing macroeconomic uncertainty, inflation can increase bank 
margins. We employ the overnight interbank rate to represent the interest rate. 
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Representing monetary policy as well as the marginal costs of funds, higher 
interest rates can lead to larger margins. Interest rate uncertainty is measured 
by the standard deviation of the monthly overnight interbank rate. It captures 
the uncertainty that banks face in their provision of intermediation services. As 
the uncertainty heightens, banks are more likely to increase net margins. We also 
include a foreign bank dummy (Poghosyan, 2010) and two crisis dummies (for the 
Asian and global financial crises) to control for the potential pricing differences of 
foreign banks and the effects of financial crises, respectively.
The static panel model, such as Equation (1), is typically estimated using 
traditional panel estimators. However, in our case, two features in our model 
specification require attention: the inclusion of a time-invariant Islamic bank 
dummy and potential non-zero correlation between unobserved bank-specific 
effects and the explanatory variables, or the endogeneity problem. The use 
of bank-specific variables lagged by one period can address the endogeneity 
concern. Moreover, it is unlikely that a variable at the bank level, that is, bank 
margins, would affect macroeconomic variables. However, we argue that the 
Islamic banking market share can be correlated with bank-specific effects, such 
as managerial style and managerial risk aversion, and is therefore endogenous. In 
view of this and following Iwanics-Drozdowska and Witkowski (2016), we apply 
the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) approach, where the computation of 
standard errors allows for cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity. The approach, 
allowing autocorrelation in the data, is based on the Prais–Winsten estimator. 
With robust standard errors, the inferences made will not be spurious (Beck and 
Katz, 1995). We take Equation (1) estimated by the Prais–Winsten estimator as 
our baseline. For robustness checks, we experiment with alternative estimators, 
namely, the random effect, the Hausman–Taylor instrumental variable, and the 
system GMM estimators.
IV. DATA AND RESULTS
We employ unbalanced panel data for 21 conventional banks and 16 Islamic banks 
over the period from 1997 to 2015.4 The bank-level data are obtained from Fitch 
Connect. The classification into Islamic and conventional banks, banking sector-
specific data (e.g., number and financing shares of Islamic and conventional banks), 
and macroeconomic variables are obtained from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
published by Bank Negara Malaysia, Malaysia’s central bank. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics of the variables for all banks, Islamic banks, and conventional 
banks, respectively. Table 2 presents their pairwise correlation coefficients.
4 The time span is dictated by the availability of all the relevant data at the time this study began. Our 
look at recent data does not reveal many changes in the Islamic banking share, which is our key 
variable, and the data are available only up to 2017, and then only for some banks. Accordingly, we 
do not believe that the addition of one or two more years of observations is likely to have a material 
impact on the results.
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Several observations are worth noting in the tables. First, as anticipated, the 
intermediation costs or margins of Islamic banks are, on average, higher than 
those of conventional bank margins. This finding indicates that Islamic banking 
products are more costly. Second, in line with the international sample of Beck 
et al. (2013), Islamic banks have better loan quality, lend more, and have higher 
operating costs per unit of assets. However, Islamic banks in Malaysia tend to be 
different, in that they have lower capitalization. Moreover, their income depends 
heavily on financing. Interestingly, they have less market power. This could be due 
to the consolidation of domestic conventional banks since the Asian crisis, which 
has allowed them to set higher prices for their products. Third, Table 2 gives a first 
indication that Islamic banking participation likely brings down intermediation 
costs, as reflected in the negative correlation between bank margins and Islamic 
financing share. 
Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics of the data used in the paper for a sample of all banks and two-subsamples of 
Islamic and conventional banks: BM is bank margins measured by net interest margins; LERNER is the Lerner index; 
EQA is the ratio of equity to total assets; NPL is ratio of non-performing loans to total loans; Ln(LOAN) is the natural 
logarithm of total loans; OPCOST is ratio of operating expenses to total assets; NII is the ratio of non-interest income 
to total income; IBShare is the financing share of Islamic banks; σ(INTR) is the standard deviation of the monthly 
overnight interbank rate; INTR is the overnight interbank rate; ∆Y is GDP growth rate; INF is inflation rate.
Variable
All Banks Islamic Banks Conventional Banks
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
BM  2.335  0.772  2.445  0.830  2.290  0.743
LERNER  0.403  0.110  0.383  0.124  0.411  0.104
EQA 10.588  6.110  8.444  3.874 11.466  6.625
NPL  5.657  7.458  4.392  5.213  6.175  8.152
Ln(LOAN)  7.657  1.857  7. 707  1.009  7.636  2.109
OPCOST  1.368  0.523  1.389  0.547  1.359  0.513
NII 16.738 11.168  8.813  7.235 19.973 10.877
IBShare 13.455  7.794
σ(INTR)  0.322  0.563
INTR  3.468  1.654
∆Y  4.632  3.949
INF  2.446  1.294
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We further note the potential importance of market power/competition 
and non-interest rate income in explaining bank margins. The higher margins 
of Islamic banks could stem from their inability to adopt a cross-subsidization 
strategy, given that they have substantially lower levels of non-interest income. In 
addition, the size of banking operations and operating costs tend to be important. 
Both are positively related to bank margins. Finally, we observe low correlation 
coefficients between the pairs of explanatory variables, except in very few cases. 
Thus, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue.
A. Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the results of Equation (1) using the Prais–Winsten estimator. In 
the empirical implementation, we allow for different autocorrelation coefficients 
across banks.5 We estimate six different specifications of Equation (1). In regressions 
(1) to (3), we include only bank-specific variables as control variables. Meanwhile, 
regressions (4) to (6) extend the control variables to include the macroeconomic 
variables. In all the regressions, we control for the effects of the foreign bank and 
crisis dummies on bank margins.
5 The assumption of a common correlation coefficient across banks does not materially affect the 
results.
Table 3.
Estimation Results – Net Interest Margin
This table reports the baseline results. The estimations are performed using the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSE) estimator allowing for autocorrelation in the data (the Prais - Winston estimator). p-values in parentheses: * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Independent
Variables
Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IB -0.0639 0.1206* -0.0419 0.1144*
(0.236) (0.057) (0.381) (0.067)
IBSHARE -0.0223*** -0.0259*** -0.0204*** -0.0238***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FB -0.0075 0.0282 0.0703 0.0080 0.0316 0.0715
(0.885) (0.576) (0.114) (0.868) (0.525) (0.106)
LERNER 2.7089*** 2.2435*** 2.1301*** 2.5888*** 2.2266*** 2.1232***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EQA 0.0033 0.0076** 0.0102** 0.0042 0.0075* 0.0100**
(0.405) (0.050) (0.014) (0.285) (0.051) (0.015)
NPL 0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0039 0.0018 -0.0039 -0.0038
(0.539) (0.238) (0.277) (0.556) (0.273) (0.309)
Ln(LOAN) 0.0461*** 0.0800*** 0.0988*** 0.0550*** 0.0807*** 0.0984***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
OPCOST 0.6740*** 0.6170*** 0.5934*** 0.6580*** 0.6183*** 0.5964***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NII -0.0279*** -0.0259*** -0.0242*** -0.0272*** -0.0259*** -0.0242***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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The estimation results generally conform to expectations and lend themselves 
to intuitive interpretation. As Table 3 shows, market power, the equity-to-assets 
ratio, the size of lending activities, operating costs, and non-interest income are 
robustly and significantly related to bank margins. Market power, as measured 
by the Lerner index, enters positively and significantly at the 1% level in all 
regressions. Thus, conforming to expectations, banks in Malaysia are likely 
to exercise their market power by charging higher margins. The same result is 
reported by Trinugroho et al. (2018) for Islamic rural banks in Indonesia. It is also 
in line with Trinugroho et al. (2014) for Indonesia, Kasman et al. (2010) for new 
European members and candidate countries, and Birchwood et al. (2017) for Central 
America and the Caribbean. As expected, the degree of risk aversion as measured 
by the equity-to-asset ratio is associated with higher margins. Abdul Kadir Malim 
et al. (2017) also document a positive association between risk aversion and bank 
margins in a panel sample of 70 Islamic banks from 18 countries. Trinugroho et 
al. (2018), however, do not find a significant relation between the equity-to-assets 
ratio and bank margins.
The size of banking operations as measured by the size of loans is significantly 
and positively related to bank margins. This result conforms to the prediction of 
the dealership model. Since the size of lending activities is closely related to bank 
size, it likely reflects the dominance of “too big to fail” or moral hazard effects 
over the effect of economies of scale as banks grow. The result contradicts findings 
Table 3.
Estimation Results – Net Interest Margin (Continued)
Independent
Variables
Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ(INTR) 0.1710*** 0.0547 0.0555
(0.000) (0.221) (0.262)
INTR -0.0317 -0.0234 -0.0186
(0.478) (0.449) (0.590)
ΔY 0.0283*** 0.0223*** 0.0220***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INF -0.0117 -0.0101 -0.0111
(0.375) (0.238) (0.244)
AFC 1.1307*** 0.9059*** 0.8947*** 1.4891*** 1.3067*** 1.2673***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GFC 0.0221 0.0007 0.0022 0.2028*** 0.1509*** 0.1513***
(0.680) (0.984) (0.950) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.3200* 0.6268*** 0.5072*** 0.2157 0.5432*** 0.4178**
(0.061) (0.000) (0.007) (0.267) (0.003) (0.040)
N 470 470 470 470 470 470
# of Banks 37 37 37 37 37 37
R2 0.5597 0.5756 0.5770 0.5669 0.5792 0.5803
Chi2 1025.2799 981.4577 873.4208 3441.0917 1516.8851 1237.8291
(p-values) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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for Islamic banks by Abdul Kadir Malim et al. (2017) and Trinugroho et al. (2018). 
Using total assets as a measure of bank size, these authors find, respectively, 
negative and nonsignificant coefficients of bank size. Compared to the banking 
literature in general, our results are in line with those of Poghosyan (2010) for 11 
Central and Eastern European countries and those of Were and Wambua (2014) 
for Kenya; however, they contradict those of Kasman et al. (2010) for European 
countries, Poghosyan (2013) for low-Income countries and emerging markets, 
Fungacova and Poghosyan (2011) for Russia, and Trinugroho et al. (2014) for 
Indonesia. Note that, among these studies, Kasman et al. (2010) and Poghosyan 
(2010, 2013) employ the natural logarithm of bank loans, similar to the present 
study, as a measure of banking activity.
We also find operating costs to be consistently positive and significant in all 
regressions. In a similar vein probably indicating cross-subsidization strategy, 
non-interest income, as a measure of diversification, is significantly negative 
in all regressions. These results conform well with the above-noted literature. 
Interestingly, we do not find credit risk to be a significant determinant of bank 
margins in Malaysia. Similarly, there seems to be no pricing difference between 
domestic and foreign banks, as reflected in the nonsignificance of the foreign 
bank dummy. Finally, among the macroeconomic variables, only GDP growth is 
significantly related to bank margins, with a positive coefficient, suggesting that 
bank margins widen during economic upturns. Trinugroho et al. (2018) document 
a similar finding for rural Islamic banks in Indonesia. This suggests that the margin 
effects from the increasing credit demand and higher deposit supply outweigh 
the effects of improved business opportunities and lower risks during economic 
expansions.
Turning to our main theme, we find that the Islamic bank dummy (IB) enters 
significantly, albeit at the 10% significance level, when it is included together with 
the Islamic bank market share (IBShare) in the regressions. Based on regression 
(3) or (6), Islamic banks with comparable bank-specific characteristics and facing 
similar macroeconomic conditions as conventional banks have margins that are 
roughly 12 basis points higher, on average, equivalent to about 5% of the average 
bank margins in Malaysia. The significance of the IB dummy means that the 
differences in the theoretically based bank-specific variables do not fully explain 
the differences in Islamic and conventional banks’ net margins. In other words, 
the relatively higher margins of Islamic banks are partly due to their distinct 
characteristics, such as their unique risks, complexity of contracts, and two-layer 
governance structure. These require additional resources and thus justify the 
higher margins set by Islamic banks.
Although, comparatively, Malaysia’s Islamic banks tend to have higher 
intermediation costs, their increasing presence lowers the average margins of the 
banking sector. This is reflected in the negative coefficient of IBShare, which is 
distinguishable from zero at the 1% significance level in all regressions. Based on 
regression (6), the estimated coefficient suggests that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the share of Islamic bank financing (i.e., roughly 7.8 percentage points) 
is associated with a reduction of roughly 18.5 basis points in the bank margin, 
which is roughly 8% of the average margin. Considering that the Islamic financing 
share increased from below 2% in 1997 to over 25% in 2015, the increasing presence 
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of Islamic banking has economic significance as far as the financial intermediation 
costs are concerned. Although Islamic banks tend to be more expensive, the 
competitive pressure that they bring to the banking system makes banks more 
efficient in the allocation of financial resources.
B. Robustness Checks
We provide robustness checks of our baseline results in several directions. First, 
instead of the financing share of Islamic banks, we use their asset share as a 
measure of Islamic banking presence or penetration (Gheeraert, 2014; Abedifar et 
al., 2016; Imam and Kpodar, 2016). Second, acknowledging that the banking sector 
in Malaysia underwent a tumultuous period during the 1998–1998 Asian crisis and, 
subsequently, a restructuring and consolidation period until 2002 (Ahmad, 2007), 
we begin the sample in 2003. Third, we exclude Islamic banks from the sample to 
focus specifically on the effect of Islamic banking presence on the intermediation 
costs of conventional banks. Finally, we employ alternative methods of estimation. 
The results of these robustness exercises for the first three cases are given in Table 
4, and those from the alternative estimators are given in Table 5.
Table 4.
Estimation Results – Robustness
This table reports the results from robustness analysis using asset share as an alternative measure of Islamic banking 
share, shortening the sample, and excluding Islamic banks from the sample. The estimations are performed using 
the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) estimator allowing for autocorrelation in the data (the Prais - Winston 
estimator). p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Independent
Variables
Asset Share Shortened Sample Islamic Bank Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IB 0.1012 0.1002 0.1955** 0.1859**
(0.1047) (0.1074) (0.0275) (0.0360)
IBSHARE -0.0388*** -0.0211***
 (Financing) (0.0000) (0.0000)
IBSHARE -0.0201*** -0.0182*** -0.0284*** -0.0173***
 (Assets) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FB 0.0561 0.0604 -0.0566 -0.0711 0.0651* 0.0591
(0.2221) (0.1810) (0.4063) (0.3132) (0.0797) (0.1083)
LERNER 2.2423*** 2.2049*** 1.6736*** 1.7593*** 2.5516*** 2.5952***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EQA 0.0084** 0.0085** 0.0145*** 0.0131*** 0.0137*** 0.0126**
(0.0359) (0.0343) (0.0044) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0143)
NPL -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.2886) (0.3468) (0.1046) (0.1223) (0.8580) (0.8364)
Ln(LOAN) 0.0887*** 0.0904*** 0.1056*** 0.0970*** 0.1140*** 0.1098***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
OPCOST 0.6083*** 0.6057*** 0.6563*** 0.6679*** 0.5708*** 0.5740***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
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The results in Table 4 provide further support for our conclusions that 
(i) Islamic banking services are more costly and (ii) Islamic banking penetration 
lowers banking intermediation costs. The coefficients of IB remain positive and 
significant at better than the 5% significance level in the reduced sample, though 
their p-values are slightly higher than 10% in the regressions employing the asset 
share of Islamic banks. Meanwhile, the coefficients of IBShare are negative and 
significant in all cases. The results from excluding Islamic banks from the sample, 
in particular, confirm that Islamic banking presence does affect conventional 
banking efficiency in the allocation of financial resources, in conformity with the 
results of Abedifar et al. (2016). As for the controlled variables, the results further 
substantiate the positive effects of market power, the size of banking operations, 
operating costs, and the real GDP and the negative effects of income diversification 
on intermediation costs. Further, we find stronger evidence of the positive effects 
of the equity-to-asset ratio and interest rate uncertainty on bank margins.
Table 4.
Estimation Results – Robustness (Continued)
Independent
Variables
Asset Share Shortened Sample Islamic Bank Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NII -0.0245*** -0.0244*** -0.0234*** -0.0232*** -0.0230*** -0.0229***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
σ(INTR) 0.0939** 0.4277** 0.5652** 0.0660 0.0959**
(0.0253) (0.0285) (0.0116) (0.2354) (0.0462)
INTR -0.0163 0.0865 0.0978 0.0130 0.0224
(0.6628) (0.3208) (0.2784) (0.7835) (0.5681)
∆Y 0.0242*** 0.0131 0.0242** 0.0163*** 0.0177***
(0.0000) (0.2169) (0.0449) (0.0065) (0.0003)
INF -0.0122 -0.0168 -0.0218 0.0068 0.0047
(0.2398) (0.2678) (0.2148) (0.6139) (0.6805)
AFC 0.9308*** 1.2735*** 1.1087*** 1.0650***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
GFC 0.0289 0.1899*** 0.0570 0.1765* -0.0244 0.0120
(0.4055) (0.0000) (0.5512) (0.0725) (0.6660) (0.7937)
Constant 0.5121*** 0.3922** 0.4845* 0.3035 -0.0605 -0.0872
(0.0059) (0.0430) (0.0967) (0.2956) (0.8216) (0.7337)
N 470 470 389 389 339 339
# of Banks 37 37 37 37 21 21
R2 0.5728 0.5773 0.6163 0.6105 0.6440 0.6426
Chi2 965.9754 1431.4006 870.4162 576.8230 1192.0317 1451.5450
(p-values) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 5.
Estimation Results using Alternative Estimators – Robustness
This table reports estimation results using alternative estimators. The RE estimator is implemented with robust 
standard errors. The HT estimator takes interest rate, real GDP growth and inflation to be endogenous. Finally, 
the two-step system GMM estimator applies Winmeijer’s correction and its instrument validity and absence of 
autocorrelation of order 2 are well supported by respectively the Hansen and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests. 
p-values in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Independent
Variables
Full Sample Shortened Sample Islamic Bank Excluded
Financing Assets Financing Assets Financing Assets
Panel A: Random-Effects (RE) Estimator
IB -0.0392 -0.0534 0.0583 0.0406
(0.8235) (0.7582) (0.6584) (0.7581)
IBSHARE -0.0112 -0.0230*** -0.0167***
 (Financing) (0.1876) (0.0001) (0.0035)
IBSHARE -0.0078 -0.0152*** -0.0133***
 (Assets) (0.2650) (0.0026) (0.0097)
FB -0.0806 -0.0963 -0.2144* -0.2384* 0.0101 0.0026
(0.4766) (0.3986) (0.0787) (0.0522) (0.9153) (0.9784)
LERNER 3.2503*** 3.3180*** 2.4894*** 2.5917*** 3.0167*** 3.0737***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
NPL -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0077* -0.0072* -0.0020 -0.0021
(0.2732) (0.3104) (0.0564) (0.0827) (0.5941) (0.5772)
Ln(LOAN) 0.0213 0.0117 0.0125 -0.0013 0.0908** 0.0859**
(0.5731) (0.7534) (0.7276) (0.9732) (0.0248) (0.0361)
OPCOST 0.7871*** 0.7953*** 0.7796*** 0.7940*** 0.6536*** 0.6599***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
NII -0.0295*** -0.0297*** -0.0243*** -0.0243*** -0.0258*** -0.0258***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
∆Y 0.0255** 0.0267** 0.0133 0.0231* 0.0173 0.0186
(0.0259) (0.0204) (0.2522) (0.0518) (0.1293) (0.1020)
Panel B: Hausman-Taylor (HT) Estimator
IB -0.0357 -0.0480 0.0238 -0.0080
(0.7890) (0.7251) (0.8947) (0.9663)
IBSHARE -0.0107* -0.0168** -0.0173***
 (Financing) (0.0603) (0.0148) (0.0039)
IBSHARE -0.0073 -0.0096* -0.0138***
 (Assets) (0.1316) (0.0791) (0.0068)
FB -0.0774 -0.0917 -0.3358* -0.3864** -0.0025 -0.0129
(0.5727) (0.5112) (0.0731) (0.0483) (0.9828) (0.9114)
LERNER 3.2975*** 3.3720*** 2.5652*** 2.6569*** 2.9117*** 2.9609***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
EQA 0.0033 0.0024 0.0080 0.0066 0.0118* 0.0107*
(0.5912) (0.6910) (0.1790) (0.2633) (0.0519) (0.0744)
Ln(LOAN) 0.0189 0.0095 -0.0475 -0.0739* 0.0902*** 0.0845**
(0.6203) (0.8021) (0.2838) (0.0973) (0.0069) (0.0112)
OPCOST 0.7897*** 0.7988*** 0.7652*** 0.7738*** 0.6342*** 0.6394***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Financial Intermediation Costs in a Dual Banking System: The Role of Islamic Banking 545
In Table 5, we report the results using alternative estimators, namely, the 
random effect (RE), the Hausman–Taylor instrumental variable (HT), and the 
system GMM (SGMM) estimators. The random effect estimator, as an alternative 
to the other traditional fixed effect estimator, allows for the inclusion of time-
invariant variables, such as the Islamic bank and foreign bank dummies in our 
case (Ibrahim and Rizvi, 2018). However, the random effect estimator yields 
inconsistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity. We could argue that the 
Islamic banking market share can be correlated with bank-specific effects such as 
managerial style and risk aversion, and therefore it is endogenous. Accordingly, 
following Kafle et al. (2018) and Lepetit et al. (2018), we also apply the HT estimator. 
Finally, we incorporate dynamics in our model specification by including the 
lagged dependent variable and then estimating the model using the system GMM 
estimator. We limit the number of instruments to avoid the problem of instrument 
proliferation (Roodman, 2009). However, the GMM results should be viewed with 
caution, given the small number of cross-sectional units in our sample.
In the estimation, we include all explanatory variables, as in column (6) of Table 
3. To conserve space, we do not tabulate the results for the two crisis dummies 
or the results for other variables that are nonsignificant in all the regressions. 
The results suggesting the benefit of Islamic banking penetration in reducing 
banking intermediation costs and hence improving the efficient intermediation 
Table 5.
Estimation Results using Alternative Estimators – Robustness (Continued)
Independent
Variables
Full Sample Shortened Sample Islamic Bank Excluded
Financing Assets Financing Assets Financing Assets
NII -0.0296*** -0.0297*** -0.0236*** -0.0237*** -0.0252*** -0.0251***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
∆Y 0.0250** 0.0262** 0.0119 0.0186 0.0171 0.0184
(0.0416) (0.0321) (0.4589) (0.2309) (0.1804) (0.1471)
Panel C: System-GMM Estimator
BMt-1 0.5158*** 0.3950*** 0.5416** 0.4635** 0.2226 0.2090
(0.0008) (0.0088) (0.0297) (0.0161) (0.5672) (0.7316)
IB -0.1549 -0.1901 -0.2639 -0.1540
(0.7333) (0.6265) (0.5884) (0.7166)
IBSHARE -0.0170 -0.0256** -0.0581***
 (Financing) (0.2237) (0.0323) (0.0030)
IBSHARE -0.0189** -0.0234** -0.0087
 (Assets) (0.0409) (0.0403) (0.6702)
NPL 0.0095 0.0082 0.0033 0.0049 0.0123* 0.0065
(0.1343) (0.2543) (0.7353) (0.6256) (0.0822) (0.3433)
Ln(LOAN) -0.0302 -0.0301 -0.0115 -0.0260 0.5906*** 0.0377
(0.7447) (0.7404) (0.9150) (0.7933) (0.0019) (0.8868)
σ(INTR) -0.0685 0.0184 0.3981 0.4691* 0.1343 0.1587
(0.5970) (0.8615) (0.1950) (0.0751) (0.4206) (0.3527)
∆Y 0.0247** 0.0242** 0.0232** 0.0271** 0.0157 0.0215
(0.0199) (0.0137) (0.0200) (0.0378) (0.2644) (0.1015)
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of financial resources are quite robust to the alternative estimators, as well as to 
the employment of the Islamic banking asset share, to the reduced sample, and to 
the exclusion of Islamic banks. By contrast, the IB dummy becomes nonsignificant 
throughout. The RE and HT estimators further reaffirm the significance of market 
power, operating costs, and diversification in affecting bank margins, in line with 
the previously documented findings. Use of the system GMM, however, makes 
most of the variables become nonsignificant, which could be attributed to the 
small sample size.
In a nutshell, our robustness checks further support the role of Islamic banking 
presence in reducing financial intermediation costs. Additionally, our robustness 
exercise shows some support for the greater cost of Islamic banks. Apart from 
these results, we could attribute the differences in the margins between Islamic 
and conventional banks to market power, operating costs, and diversification. The 
higher operating costs and lower non-interest income of Islamic banks in particular 
partly account for the higher margins. Taken together, the results strengthen the 
case for further penetration of the Islamic banking sector and its positive role in 
the economy, as well as a call for improvements in cost efficiency and expansion 
into non-intermediation activities by Islamic banks. Further, given evidence of the 
greater cost of Islamic banking, measures are needed to reduce the incremental 
costs incurred by Islamic banks in their adherence to Shari’ah principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid penetration of Islamic banking in the global financial scene has captivated 
greater research interest, especially in its contribution to financial and economic 
development. In this paper, we address the extent to which Islamic banking 
presence affects financial intermediation costs, by comparing the net margins of 
Islamic and conventional banks (direct effect) and assessing the relation between 
Islamic banking penetration and the intermediation costs of the banking sector 
(indirect effect). The analysis provides evidence that Islamic banks have higher net 
margins. Islamic banking presence, as represented by the ratio of Islamic financing 
to aggregate bank credit/financing and, alternatively, the share of Islamic banking 
assets, is, however, robustly associated with lower bank margins, on average. 
Apart from these key findings, we note that market power, operating costs, and 
diversification appear to be the most robust determinants of bank margins in 
Malaysia. Thus, the higher cost inefficiency and lower diversification of Islamic 
banks seem to partly contribute to higher intermediation costs of Islamic banks.
These results provide firm grounds for further expansion of Islamic banking, 
since it improves efficiency in the banking system’s allocation of financial resources. 
At the same time, several recommendations are made to lower the intermediation 
costs of Islamic banks. Namely, Islamic banks must look for ways to reduce the 
incremental costs related to their adherence to Shari’ah principles, for example, 
by improving risk management, simplifying financial contracts, and becoming 
more cost efficient. These could require a more competitive Islamic banking 
environment. Finally, Islamic banks need to diversify their income-generating 
activities by expanding into non-intermediation activities, which are presently at 
far lower levels than those of conventional banks.
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